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“Some sort of an agreed line” 
The negotiations for the ceasefire 
demarcation line in Cyprus, 
30 July – 9 August 1974
Georgios Kazamias
Usng recently declassfied Brtsh documents, ths paper looks at the negotatons for 
the demarcaton of an agreed ceasefire lne between the nvadng Turksh forces and 
the defendng Greek-Cyprot Natonal Guard. These negotatons took place n Cyprus 
between the end of July and 9 August 1974 and were successful only n part, as the 
attempt to draw a mutually agreed lne eventually proved futle. 
Through the examnaton of the avalable documents, ths paper hghlghts a num-
ber of areas: t draws a vvd pcture of the negotatons themselves and the dfficultes 
they faced; t sheds lght on some of the ams and objectves of Brtan; t gves some 
nformaton of the condtons on the ground n Cyprus durng the tragc and confused 
perod between the first and second nvason; last but not least, t draws out the ams 
and ultmate polcy of Turkey, the nvadng power, whch were to become amply ev-
dent only a few days later.
The am of ths paper s to examne one of the lesser known aspects of the events of the 
1974 Turksh nvason of Cyprus, n partcular the negotatons for the demarcaton 
of a ceasefire lne. The paper uses the offical record kept by the Brtsh representatves 
at the negotatons that took place between the two rounds of the Turksh nvason 
of July and August 1974, n order to reach “some sort of an agreed lne”1 as Stephen 
Olver, the Brtsh Hgh Commssoner n Ncosa called t. 
Any mltary conflct may be seen as the loss of stablty n a partcular area and the 
begnnng of the quest for a new power dstrbuton. Thus, after any mltary conflct 
1 The phrase comes from Olver’s fnal report on the work of the commttee, sent to A. C. Goodson of 
the Foregn and Commonwealth Offce (FCO), at the tme n Geneva for the second round of talks. 
See TNA, FCO 9/1926, letter, Olver to Goodson, Demarcaton of the Cease Fre [sc] lne, 9 August 
1974:2.
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s over, the begnnng of the stablsaton process s a sort of stocktakng, where the 
two sdes regster ther postons and agree to the lnes of confrontaton at a gven 
date. Very often the result of ths stocktakng s a no-man’s land. Ths zone, stuated 
between the bellgerents, ams to separate the two opposng sdes and attempts to pre-
vent an accdental flare-up of the conflct. In the post-1945 world, ths zone further 
accords a measure of securty to the two sdes: often nether sde s allowed to enter 
ths zone, and peacekeepng troops are nvted to patrol and control t. Whle such 
zones are meant to be temporary, on occason they acqure notable permanence.2
The legal bass as well as the general framework on whch the process was based, 
was the Geneva Declaraton of 30 July 1974. Among others, ths text establshed 30 
July 1974 (2000 hrs) as the effectve pont n tme for the cessaton of hostltes, fol-
lowng whch the lne of the opposng forces would “freeze”. Furthermore, t stpu-
lated that “representatves of Greece, Turkey and the Unted Kngdom n consultaton 
wth the Unted Natons Peace-keepng Force on Cyprus (UNFICYP)” should estab-
lsh “the lmt of the areas occuped by the Turksh armed forces”, at 2200 hrs on 30 
July.3 Thus from the begnnng, the UN was gven an ancllary, consultatve role, wth 
the opposng sdes (Greece and Turkey) and Brtan assumng the man responsbl-
ty for the process, n ther capacty as Guarantor Powers of the Republc of Cyprus. 
Beyond consultng, the UN would assume responsblty for the securty of the Turk-
sh enclaves n the (at the tme) unoccuped part of Cyprus and patrol the securty 
zone, whose sze and character was also not establshed. The exchange of prsoners 
(mltary and cvlan) was entrusted to the Internatonal Red Cross.
Followng the declaraton n Geneva, the lead as regards demarcaton of the secu-
rty zone was taken by the Brtsh. The reason s obvous: wth Greece and Turkey 
de facto bellgerents n Cyprus, the only guarantor power left to presde was Brtan. 
In Cyprus the man burden fell on the shoulders of the Brtsh Hgh Commssoner, 
Stephen J. Olver and Col. J. J. G. [Jerry] Hunter hs Defence Advsor.4 An nvtaton 
to begn talks was ssued mmedately, wth the expectaton that the talks could be 
completed n a few days.5 ... However, despte the urgency that the Brtsh Hgh 
2 The most famous such zone s n the mddle of the Korean pennsula and dates from 1953, so has 
lasted even longer than the Cyprus conflct.
3 For the full text of the declaraton see Geneva Declaraton, 1974. The Declaraton tself resulted from 
the falure of the Turksh armed forces to respect the ceasefire arranged under US auspces that came 
nto force on 22 July 1974 at 1400 hrs GMT. For the ceasefire agreement see, among others, Kssnger, 
2000:1192; Arapaks, 2000:241–272. On the Turksh part n the volatons of the ceasefire between 22 
and 29 July, see Henn, 2004:378–399.
4 Stephen John Lnley Olver (b. 1917), C.M.G., M.B.E., Brtsh Hgh Commssoner, Ncosa, had pre-
sented hs credentals to Presdent Makaros on 7 March 1973; see Cyprus Mail, Sunday 8 March 1973. 
He had orgnally been n the Indan Poltcal Servce and had transferred to the Foregn Office n 
1948. In December 1974 he was awarded a K.B.E. He retred n 1975. See Burkes Peerage (nternet); 
The Times, 28 August 1975.
5 FCO 9/1926, tel. no. 367, FCO to Ncosa, 011350z, 1 August 1974. Accordng to the text of the tel-
egram, sgned by Callaghan, the three foregn mnsters had agreed n Geneva that the demarcaton 
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Commssoner tred to breathe nto the proceedngs, wth communcatons to the 
two sdes as early as 30 July, the meetngs only began n the afternoon of 2 August. 
The Brtsh records place the responsblty for the delay squarely on the shoulders 
of the Turksh sde: whle a meetng at 0830 on 2 August was proposed, the Turksh 
representatve was unavalable untl the afternoon. As Olver wrote, n a telegram sent 
to London the same day:
I expressed our serous dsappontment at ths further delay. [...] A delay untl late ths 
afternoon wll rule out any helcopter survey untl tomorrow. A further 24 hours wll thus 
have been lost. There seems to be absolutely no sense of urgency here on the Turksh sde 
about gettng ths operaton under way. If we are to make any substantal progress today 
pressure wll have to be exerted n Ankara.6
Securng agreement to begn talks proved to be no easy task. An exchange of seven-
teen telegrams was requred durng 1 and 2 August (three of them from Callaghan, 
the Brtsh Foregn Secretary hmself) untl the Turksh sde declared t was ready to 
send a representatve to the talks.7
The commttee formed for the talks comprsed three members. The Charman 
of the Demarcaton Commttee was Col. J. J. G. [Jerry] Hunter, the Brtsh Defence 
Attaché n Ncosa. The Greek Representatve was Major (Eng) Evangelos G. Tsolaks, 
who was also the (Cyprus) Natonal Guard Lason Officer wth UNFICYP. The Turk-
sh Representatve was Colonel Nezh Cakar, Deputy Chef of Staff to General Ersn, 
Commander of the Turksh Force, and, snce 23 July, Turksh Lason Officer wth 
UNFICYP. In addton to the above, UNFICYP was represented by ts Deputy Chef 
of Staff, the Canadan Colonel C. Beatte.8 The commttee was supported by an expert 
cartographer, Leut. Col. T. A. Lnley, Royal Engneers, from HQ Near East Land 
Forces, Major R. K. Collns, HQ Brtsh Forces Near East, who acted as ts Secretary 
and assorted other Brtsh personnel (draughtsman, stenographers etc.).9 
“should be completed by 31 July and mmedate reports of the coordnates establshed should be sent 
to them”. On 2 August, Olver estmated they would need “at least two days to complete ths process, 
possbly more”. See FCO 9/1926, Ncosa to FCO tel. no. 559, 2 August 1974. 
6 FCO 9/1926, Ncosa to FCO tel. no. 549, 2 August 1974. Another telegram next day confirmed that “t 
seemed clear that the Turks were stll playng for tme”; see FCO 9/1926, Ncosa to FCO tel. no. 566, 
3 August 1974.
7 FCO 9/1926, folos 1–17. Callaghan sent a personal message to Gunes, the Turksh Foregn Mnster 
on 1 August (FCO to Ankara, tel. no. 902) and returned to ths agan on 2 August (FCO to Ankara, tel. 
no. 908) and sent nstructons to Ncosa on 1 August (FCO to Ncosa, tel. no. 367); he had also asked 
for US pressure on the Turksh sde: see tel. no. 908, FCO to Ankara, 2 August 1974: “Washngton 
should mmedately contact Eagleburger or Ssco and ask the Amercans to ntervene on Ankara on 
ths subject [demarcaton] as forcefully as they can”.
8 See Henn, 2004:395–396. Cakar retred from the Turksh Armed Forces wth the rank of General; 
n the late 1990s he served as Senor Advsor to the Presdent of Turkey. Tsolaks also retred from 
the Hellenc Armed Forces wth the rank of General. See Porsma, 1989:278. Beatte was also the 
Commander of the Canadan Contngent. See Henn, 2004:308. 
9 Perhaps because t was superseded by later events, the general mage of the work of ths commttee 
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Begnnng on 2 August, there were n all eght meetngs of the demarcaton com-
mttee. They took place n the UNFICYP’s Headquarters, n Blue Beret Camp, at the 
Eastern Permeter of Ncosa Arport (Henn, 2004:50). 
What was requred of the commttee was to establsh the lmt of the Turksh ad-
vance, by means of reconnassance (by car and helcopter) and to transfer ths on to 
a map that would be sent to Geneva, for the second round of talks, that were to begn 
(accordng to Artcle 5 of the Geneva Declaraton) on 8 August 1974. The lst of meet-
ngs and ther man preoccupatons are set out n Table 1:
Table 1: Meetings of the Ceasefire Demarcation Committee
2 Aug. 1430–1830 Dscusson on the Terms of Reference.
3 Aug. 0700–1830 Ratficaton of Mnutes; Greek and Turksh representatves trace 
respectve lnes on the map; dscusson of the ceasefire lne. 
4 Aug. 1000–1710 (meetng 
adjourns 1145 to 1445)
Dscusson of Turksh eastern and western lne, excludng 
Ncosa; unable to agree. Eventual agreement to establsh the 
lne currently occuped by Turksh troops (wthout prejudce 
to poston on 30 July). Helcopter reconnassance: confirmed 
Lapthos was stll n Greek hands, no Turksh troops between 
Vasslea and the Kornos pass; Greek request for further 
reconnassance refused by Turksh representatve.
5 Aug. 0820–2030 (or 2145) Helcopter reconnassance of area NE of Ncosa to coast. 
6 Aug. 0830–2145 Dscusson of the Ncosa area.
7 Aug. 0900–1945 Includes ground reconnassance, Western Ncosa area.
8 Aug. 0800–? Further reconnassance of Ncosa area.
9 Aug. Draftng the final report; sgnature ceremony n front of the Press.
Source: The Natonal Archves (UK), FCO 9/1926
Delaying tactics and crisis points
Followng the delayed start, there were further delays once the meetngs began. The 
Brtsh vew appears to have been that the Turksh sde’s polcy was to delay the talks, 
has been rather confused. Both the work of the commttee and the Brtsh role n convenng the com-
mttee and n ts work has generally been understated. In one case the Brtsh nvolvement s entrely 
omtted whle elsewhere naccuraces on the dates are recorded. The most precse account s to be 
found n Henn, 2004:415–416; however, even n ths case the author devotes less than a page to ths 
epsode, n over 470 pages of text.
 At the first meetng UN stenographers were used, but, accordng to the Brtsh Hgh Commssoner, 
they proved to be “completely ncompetent”. See FCO 9/1926, letter, Olver to Goodson, 5 August 
1974. Other experts were also used on occason: Major Tsolaks was accompaned on one of the recon-
nassance flghts by another Greek officer, Major zervas. Other experts were also called n by all sdes. 
See FCO 9/1926, D.M. Day (Ncosa) to R. H. Baker (FCO), enclosng a copy of the final report of “The 
Geneva Declaraton of 30 July 1974, Report on the Demarcaton Talks”, p. 1.
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n order to acheve the maxmum terrtoral gans and expand the area they occu-
ped.10 Thus the records lay the blame squarely at the feet of the Turksh sde. 
On 4 August n a telegram to the FCO Olver noted “a tendency by the Turksh rep-
resentatve to filbuster (he took 1½ hours yesterday mornng to approve the admt-
tedly rather chaotc mnutes of the first meetng and n general proceeds at the most 
lesurely possble pace)”.11 The next day t was observed that Cakar, the Turksh rep-
resentatve, was “also much gven to tme wastng wth rather pedantc correctons”.12 
Even after the process was over, n hs final report the Brtsh Hgh Commssoner 
commented on the “unfortunate 48 hours delay n gettng the demarcaton exercse 
under way: here the Turksh Colonel has frankly admtted that they were not pre-
pared to start, even f the rest of us had been”.13 The Brtsh Hgh Commssoner seems 
to have thought that the general behavour of the Turksh representatve ted n well 
wth Turksh polcy: Olver judged Cakar to be “suave, hghly ntellgent and abso-
lutely ted to the apron strngs of hs hgh command, whom he consults at frequent 
ntervals, always wth depressng results”.14 
As regards the Greek sde, the Brtsh seemed largely convnced that t was try-
ng to reach some agreement. Tsolaks, the Greek representatve, dd try to put for-
ward well-founded arguments n support of the postons of the Greek sde. Indeed, 
the overall record and the Brtsh prase for hm pont to ths. Accordng to Olver, 
Tsolaks “a brght young Natonal Guard Staff Officer [...] began these proceedngs 
very much worse brefed than the Turk, but has now caught up and s gvng a good 
account of hmself. He s more relaxed and less rgd than Cakar, but also naturally 
under farly tght control from Natonal Guard Headquarters”.15 However, no allega-
tons of delays or obstructonsm are levelled at hm.
The meetngs took place durng a dfficult perod: the fragle ceasefire was largely 
observed by the Greek sde and largely flouted by the Turksh sde, as observed by 
both the Brtsh and UNFICYP.16 The local condtons contnuously threatened to at 
least delay the proceedngs or even entrely deral the condtons. As late as 8 August, 
when the second Geneva Conference was startng, the demarcaton was supposed to 
have been completed, and the last stumblng block (the lne n the area of Ncosa) 
10 Ths was confrmed by the events, but also at the tme by a set of Turksh operatonal orders found on 
a Turksh major captured on 31 July. See Sergs, 1996:542–546. The orders gave detals for the attack 
on the Karavas-Lapthos area.
11 FCO 9/1926, Ncosa to FCO tel. no. 598, 4 August 1974.
12 FCO 9/1926, letter Olver (Ncosa) to Goodson (FCO), 5 August 1974.
13 FCO 9/1926, letter Olver (Ncosa) to Goodson (FCO), 9 August 1974.
14 FCO 9/1926, letter Olver (Ncosa) to Goodson (FCO), 5 August 1974.
15 FCO 9/1926, letter Olver (Ncosa) to Goodson (FCO), 5 August 1974. On another occason the 
Greek representatve s descrbed as “a reasonable man”, whle the Turksh representatve “sounds 
an mpossble character and who, furthermore, always had hs apron strngs tghtly grasped by the 
Turksh Hgh Command”: see letter Olver (Ncosa) to Goodson (FCO), 9 August 1974.
16 See e.g. FCO 9/1926, Ncosa to FCO tel. no. 597, 4 August 1974. Cf. Henn, 2004:406–418.
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was mostly agreed, firng along the Green lne was reported — as well as Turksh 
advances, whch threatened to delay the completon of the task.17 
A further crss was caused by the BBC World News report of 1700 on 4 August, a 
few days after the start of the process. On that day the BBC clamed that the talks were 
close to stallng, due to Greek ntransgence. The result was an mmedate request by 
Stephen Olver for “mmedate steps [...] to nduce the BBC to adopt a more respons-
ble atttude to ther reportng of the demarcaton talks. If we are not careful they wll 
so sour the atmosphere that no progress wll be possble. We are tacklng the BBC cor-
respondent here”.18 A further crss was caused by the Turksh clam (lodged through 
the Turksh representatve at the talks), that the UN had “no mandate to operate n 
the area under Turksh control” and “no authorty to enter nto Turksh rear areas”19 
and thus verfy the postons that the Turksh Armed Forces had reached.20 However, 
by far the greatest problem the talks faced was the Turksh clam to have occuped 
partcular areas, clams that were proven to be unfounded.
Indeed, throughout the talks the Turksh sde mantaned that the lne they were 
agreeng to was what they had already occuped on 30 July (the date set by the Geneva 
Declaraton). However, there were several nstances where, as the Brtsh Hgh Com-
mssoner reported, ths was not true. One such case was the Ncosa Golf Course 
(whch both the Brtsh Hgh Commssoner hmself and the French Ambassador 
could observe from ther respectve embassy buldngs) whch, despte Turksh clams 
to the contrary, had only been occuped on 31 July.21 On another occason, on 3 Au-
gust, the Greek sde rased objectons to Turksh clams they had already occuped 
(among other ponts) the Kornos saddle (on the western sde of the Pentadaktylos 
range); n fact, a relatvely well-known ncdent on the saddle on 2 August had agan 
proven that Turksh clams were false.22 
The town of Lapthos was another nstance of false Turksh clams. The helcopter 
reconnassance of the area by the commttee members showed that Lapthos was stll 
n Greek hands (Greek flags were flyng n the town), whle no Turksh troops were 
present between Vasslea and the Kornos pass. The Greek request for a reconnas-
sance was flatly refused by the Turksh representatve. The Brtsh Hgh Comms-
soner noted n hs report that attempts to persuade hm contnued “for three hours 
after the helcopter returned to base at dark, but the Turksh representatve refused 
to budge. Hs argument was that Turksh artllery [...] domnated the entre coastal 
17 FCO 9/1926, tel. Ncosa to FCO, 081555z, whch reports condtons at 1500 hrs.
18 FCO 9/1926, Ncosa to FCO tel. no. 607, 4 August 1974.
19 FCO 9/1926, The Geneva Declaraton of 30 July 1974-Report on the demarcaton talks, p. 3, pont 
10.
20 Indeed, ths culmnated later, durng the second round of the Geneva talks, when the Turks requested 
Kurt Waldhem to wthdraw UN forces from occuped areas. See Callaghan, 1987:350. 
21 FCO 9/1926, letter Olver (Ncosa) to Goodson (FCO), 9 August 1974.
22 Ths was probably lnked to the well-known ncdent of the Turksh tank convoy partly destroyed and 
partly captured on 2 August. See Stamats, 2007:148.
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area whch was thus n Turksh hands; he even at one pont clamed that a Turksh 
destroyer off ths part of the coast sgnfied Turksh occupaton of the area”. Ths 
nstance caused the strongest condemnaton on the part of the Brtsh: 
The Turksh poston over ths coastal strp s wholly specous [...] unless we are quckly 
enabled to fly the helcopter reconnassance justfiably requested by the Greek represent-
atve, the whole future of ths demarcaton attempt may be n jeopardy, wth foreseeable 
consequences for the Greek atttude towards Geneva. Tme s vtal n vew of the reports 
of renewed Turksh movement towards Lapthos.23
In ths case, the Turksh ntransgence gave rse to a Greek refusal to dscuss Ncosa 
demarcaton unless the Turks agreed to a helcopter reconnassance of the area. On 4 
August the Greek representatve refused to dscuss the demarcaton of Ncosa unless 
a reconnassance of the dsputed NW corner (as t came to be called) was agreed to 
by the Turksh sde. Olver, the Brtsh Hgh Commssoner, was alarmed and asked 
the FCO to put pressure on the Turksh to agree; Callaghan hmself repled that he 
had put some pressure (but at the same tme pressure was appled to Greece also); the 
matter (on whch the Brtsh were clearly n agreement wth the Greek sde) was tem-
porarly resolved when Tsolaks nformed Hunter on the afternoon of 6 August 1974 
that he would now dscuss Ncosa. Ths appears to have been the result of develop-
ments on the field of battle, when Lapthos came under attack and was subsequently 
occuped by the Turksh Army.24
In other nstances, the evdence gven by UNFICYP was also aganst the Turk-
sh poston(s), but the latter refused to accept any UN competence n the areas they 
occuped. 
Further problems were caused by the Turksh request to have parallel acton on 
other aspects of the Geneva Declaraton, notably ther refusal to dscuss the securty 
zone that would separate the opponents. The Brtsh Hgh Commssoner n Nco-
sa had expressed, early n the talks, concern that “the Turks wll use demarcaton, 
where of course contnued delay works n ther favour, as a lever to obtan conces-
sons over other aspects of the Geneva agreement”.25 However, though there were 
some ntal Turksh attempts to apply pressure on the demarcaton commttee to 
take acton on the evacuaton of Turksh enclaves n the parts of Cyprus not occu-
ped by the Turksh army, they appear to have dropped the matter at ths level, seeng 
the firm stance of all others nvolved. Nonetheless, the Turksh refusal to dscuss the 
sze of the securty zone restrcted the talks smply to demarcaton; ths s somethng 
the Brtsh were not happy wth, but they eventually accepted that t was a poltcal 
matter, to be decded n Geneva.
23 FCO 9/1926, Ncosa to FCO tel. no. 613, 5 August 1974.
24 See FCO 9/1926, Ncosa to FCO, tel. no. 634, 6 August 1974; tel. no. 688, 8 August 1974.
25 See FCO 9/1926, Ncosa to FCO, tel. no. 550, 2 August 1974.
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By 9 August 1974, the commttee had managed to draw a ceasefire lne, but had 
faled to agree on a sngle lne. In fact, far from establshng the extent of land occu-
ped by the Turksh Forces on 30 July (as the Geneva Declaraton stpulated) t was 
found dfficult to come to an agreement even for the present postons on the con-
frontaton lne; hence the compromse was a map markng the ceasefire lne as t 
stood at the dates when reconnassance was made. In some cases the Brtsh, UNFI-
CYP and Greek representatves had all agreed on a lne, wth the Turksh representa-
tve puttng forward a dfferent verson. Ths map markng dfferng versons for each 
sde was prnted and sent to Geneva, notng the dsagreements of the two sdes n 
many sectons of the lne.26
What caused the failure? 
From the start t became evdent that comng to any sort of agreement would be a 
dfficult task. The Brtsh, beyond the chaotc aspects of battle, found a clear cause of 
dfficultes n the Turksh delayng tactcs, the hardlne approach of the Turksh sde 
and some uncertanty as to what the ams and objectves of the nvason were. Ths 
uncertanty went all the way to the top: n hs memors James Callaghan clams that 
all along he suspected the Turks were plannng further operatons: 
I must also place on record that durng these talks Gunes reassured me on two occasons 
that Turkey had no ntenton of her troops advancng nor of them remanng on the 
sland. But my doubts ncreased, especally n the lght of a talk I had wth Dr Waldhem, 
the Secretary General of the Unted Natons, who called on me n Geneva (Callaghan, 
1987:350).
The Brtsh representatves n Cyprus were also unclear about Turksh ntentons. On 
6 August, the Brtsh Hgh Commssoner wrote to London that the Turks should 
agree to a demarcaton lne, because otherwse “t may be dfficult to restran the 
Natonal Guard”.27 The UN, whch could help clear the possble obstacles, was obv-
ously n a dfficult poston. Inadequate n men and arms (there was a partcular lack 
of armoured vehcles), and wth a restrctve mandate, t saw ts role shrnk n ths 
process. Ths s obvous n the role assumed by Col. Beatte, the Canadan UNFICYP 
officer who partcpated n the talks. The Brtsh record seems to show he took a very 
26 See FCO 9/1926, “The Geneva Declaraton of 30 July 1974, Report on the Demarcaton Talks”, enclo-
sure n D.M. Day (Ncosa) to R. H. Baker (FCO), 11 August 1974.
27 FCO 9/1926, Ncosa to FCO tel. no. 634, 6 August 1974. Ths statement seems to show a lack of 
knowledge of the dsorgansaton and demoralsaton of the Natonal Guard after the ceasefire. It also 
confirms the ntal Brtsh Government assessment of the first round of the nvason, where t s noted 
that “The Turks must be dsapponted at the meagre success of ther armed nterventon”. See TNA 
(UK), CAB/128/55, “Conclusons of a Meetng of the Cabnet held at 10 Downng Street on Monday 
22 July 1974”, p. 1. See also TNA, CAB 129/178/2, “CYPRUS, Note by the Secretary of the Cabnet”, 
C(74) 77, 22 July 1974, esp. paragraph 5.
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low-key lne: there are few references to hm except n the final report where he usu-
ally agrees wth the Brtsh and Greek postons.28
Aims and objectives: a British view 
It s obvous from the above that the Brtsh sde was serously nterested n the process. 
The top level dplomat n Ncosa was drectly nvolved; the telegrams and reports on 
the workngs of the commttee exchanged between the Foregn and Commonwealth 
Office and the Ncosa Hgh Commsson were nvarably coped to 10, Downng 
Street. As well as followng the progress of the talks, when needed James Callaghan 
hmself ntervened (manly wth the Turksh government) n order to put pressure on 
the Turksh mltary to speed up the begnnng of the process;29 throughout the demar-
caton talks Callaghan contnued to apply further pressure at strategc ntervals.30 
The ams that were foremost n Brtsh mnds can be seen n ther prase of ther 
own representatve; n a report to the FCO, Olver prases Colonel Hunter who 
has faced an almost mpossble task and aganst all odds has produced at least some sort of 
an agreed lne. Workng 14, 16 or more hours a day, he has managed to keep hs cool and 
prevent the talks from breakng up. He has managed to retan a good workng relaton-
shp not only wth Tsolaks, the Greek repr who s a reasonable man, but also wth Cakar, 
the Turksh rep who sounds an mpossble character and who, furthermore, always had 
hs apron strngs tghtly grasped by the Turksh Hgh Command. Hunter even emerged 
wth a trbute from Cakar that he had been an admrably mpartal charman.31 
In fact, as far as the Greeks and the Brtsh were concerned, all ths was happenng 
wth an eye to Geneva, where the second round of the talks began on 8 August (a 
day before the demarcaton talks concluded). However the sgns n Cyprus were not 
auspcous and perhaps these sgns should have been nterpreted more clearly. Wth 
hndsght we can say that Turksh refusal to dscuss parts of the demarcaton lne (par-
tcularly where, as the later events showed, they were plannng to expand the area they 
controlled) was bad enough; ths, combned wth Turksh expanson of the areas they 
held and ther contnued renforcng of ther army n Cyprus, probably ponted the 
way to what was to follow. Yet at the tme ths seems to have gone largely unnotced.
Perhaps the most apt postscrpt to ths epsode s a hand-wrtten note on the cover 
letter accompanyng the final report. Commentng on 20 August 1974, when the sec-
ond round of the nvason had largely been completed, an FCO offical commented: 
28 FCO 9/1926, “The Geneva Declaraton of 30 July 1974, Report on the Demarcaton Talks” enclosure 
n D.M. Day (Ncosa) to R. H. Baker (FCO), 11 August 1974.
29 See note 7 above. 
30 See e.g. FCO 9/1926, FCO tel. no. 924 to Ankara and UK Msson n New York and FCO tel. no. 407 
to Ncosa, both dated 5 August 1974.
31 FCO 9/1926, letter Olver (Ncosa) to Goodson (FCO), 9 August 1974.
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“A week s a long tme n SEED [South Eastern Europe Department]. I Thnk these 
pps [pages] can be safely p.a. [put to archve]”.32
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